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Vertical Dimensions in the
Quality of Law
By
Bartram S. Brown
Chicago-Kent College of Law
Draft of 7/12/2012

Introduction and Thesis
There are compelling reasons for concern about the quality of law. Law is essential to
structuring the social relations of the state. Thomas Jefferson famously wrote that life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness are God-given unalienable rights, and that the purpose of governments is to secure
these rights on behalf of the governed.1 Whether the law of a state will be successful in this task
depends upon the quality of that law.
Concern for the quality of law is not a new idea. The Roman orator and statesman Cicero built
upon the ideas of the Greek Stoic philosophers when he stated that “human legislation” should be
evaluated for its consistency with fundamental precepts of natural justice.2
When the English King John signed Magna Carta in 1215 AD, he was forced, by rebellious nobles
and clergy, to acknowledge that the quality of English law, and of its application, was inadequate. The
great charter proclaimed that even the King himself was bound to observe the rights of subjects and
communities under the “law of the land”, but in practice it would take several more centuries before the
implied principle of the “rule of law” would be fully implemented even in England.
There are many different aspects to the quality of law, but some are, to use Jefferson’s phrase,
self-evident. In the Spirit of Laws, which many consider to be the first real example of comparative legal
scholarship, the French writer Montesquieu formulated, and justified through historical examples, his
criteria for quality legislation. Quite sensibly, he proposed that legislation should be concise, written in

1

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.” The Declaration of Independence, IN CONGRESS, July 4, 1776.
2
“There in fact a true law - namely, right reason - which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is
unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties; by its
prohibitions it restrains them from doing wrong. Its commands and prohibitions always influence good men, but
are without effect upon the bad. To invalidate this law by human legislation is never morally right, nor is it
permissible ever to restrict its operation, and to annul it wholly is impossible.” Cicero, THE REPUBLIC, II, 22.
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plain, simple and unambiguous language, and have few if any special exceptions.3 On the grander
theme of how to preserve liberty through law, he derived from his understanding of the Constitution of
England a complete theory on the necessity of the separation of powers between the legislative,
executive and judicial branches.4 That theory was soon thereafter incorporated into the Constitution of
the United States of America and eventually into many other national constitutions as well.
And of course focus upon the quality of law falls squarely within the tradition of legal reform
pioneered by Jeremy Bentham. Bentham rejected the soaring rhetoric of natural law and natural
rights.5 He was concerned about real law, man-made positive law, and how to make it better. 6
Due to the vast changes in the international legal system so presciently anticipated by Wolfgang
Friedmann in the 1960s,7 concern about the quality of law must, increasingly, focus not only upon
national legislation, but also upon the formulation of rules and standards of international law as well.
This is particularly relevant in cases where international law requires states to harmonize their national
law with internationally agreed standards in critical areas such as international human rights,
international criminal law, international trade law and international intellectual property law. In
particular, quality of law analysis should also apply to the creation, functioning and development of
international institutions.
The quality of international law may seem like an issue remote from the day-to-day concerns of
most people, but recent developments concerning the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
have brought into focus just how badly international treaty negotiations can be organized and
conducted in this day and age. We are accustomed to hearing that “transparency” is essential to the
rule of law, that fundamental human rights should in all cases be respected, and that civil society has an
essential role to play in government, including international governance. Nonetheless, and as will be
discussed below, these values were somehow set aside in preparing the text of ACTA. The result is a
treaty that, when it finally was made public, produced vehement, sometimes violent protests in multiple
countries.
3

See, Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, (1748), Translated by Thomas Nugent,
revised by J. V. Prichard, Book XXIX. Of the Manner of Composing Laws, Chapter 16. Things to be observed in the
composing of Laws. Internet Source: http://www.constitution.org/cm/sol.txt.
4

Id., Book XI, Chapter 6.
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As part of his scathing critique of natural rights discourse Bentham wrote: “Natural rights is simple nonsense:
natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,—nonsense upon stilts.” - Jeremy Bentham, A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS., The Works of Jeremy Bentham, vol. 2 [1843], Article 2,
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=1921&chapter=114230&layout=html
#a_2345508.
6
As one prominent writer noted in 1908, Bentham “demanded that all statute law, whatever the form of
government, should be based on scientific and philosophical principles, for the benefit of mankind.” Frederick N.
Judson, A Modern View of the Law Reforms of Jeremy Bentham, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 10, No1 (Jan. 1910) pp.
41-54, at page 49, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1110951.
7
See, Wolfgang Friedmann, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, New York, Columbia University Press,
1964.
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The thesis of this paper is twofold. First, it is that the various criteria that apply to assessing and
improving the quality of national law, apply mutatis mutandis when addressing the quality of a
multilateral treaty. In addition, I argue that the specific nature of the international legal system suggests
that some additional, and special, “vertical criteria” should also apply. These revolve around three
general pillars of legitimacy under contemporary international law. The first requires respect for the
sovereignty-based notion of positivism as the basis of state obligations. The second requires respect for
fundamental principle, which must be a characteristic of any true system of law purporting to promote
justice, and the third in turn requires some reasonable accommodation of the practical policy-based
necessities of cooperation in an interdependent world.
The latter part of this paper will present a brief case study on the drafting of the AntiCounterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) in a first effort to apply this analytical framework.

The Vertical Dimension and its Specificities
Concern about the quality of law focuses, in the first instance, upon the quality of law produced
by internal legal systems. At a recent conference in Italy on the Quality of law the principal paper on
international law focused only on “The impact of international law instruments on National
Legislation.”8 The quality of law lens, so to speak, was focused on national law not on international law
as such. But quality of law analysis does apply to international law, not only indirectly, when that law
affects the quality of national law, but also more directly when international legal standards are set by
multilateral “law-making” treaties.9

The nature of the international legal system
According to the currently prevailing positivist conception of international law, that law derives its binding
force from the consent of sovereign states. That consent may be expressed explicitly, as it is in treaties, or
implicitly through the practices of states which give rise to rules of customary international law. 10 Since states
have traditionally been reluctant to consent to limitations on their sovereignty, the international legal system has

8

See, Carl Henrik Ehrenkrona, The Impact of International Law Instruments on National Legislation, Report,
Seminar , “The Quality of Law”, Trieste, Italy, 14 – 17 June 2010, European Commission For Democracy Through
Law (Venice Commission), Doc. CDL-UDT(2010)021, Strasbourg, 7 July 2010,
available @
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-UDT%282010%29021-e.asp.
9
“The distinction between ‘law-making treaties’ and ‘contract treaties’ is a frequently used analytical tool in treaty
practice and doctrine. At the same time, little trace of it is found in the positive law of treaties.” Brölmann,
Catherine M., Law-Making Treaties: Form and Function in International Law (January, 28 2009). NORDIC JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, No. 74, 2005, page 1. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334266.
10
See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which defines the law which that court is to
apply in deciding disputes between states. This authoritative statement of the sources of international law refers
to three principal sources, i.e. "a. international conventions ... establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law" and "c. the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Each of these involves building law upon the recognition or
acceptance of states or nations, i.e. upon their consent. Judicial decisions and the teachings of publicists are
referred to in Article 38(d) as "subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law."
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generally been decentralized, i.e. it has had to operate without an international legislature to make international
law, an international executive to enforce that law, or international courts with effective jurisdiction to decide
even the legal aspects of the most important disputes between states. But the rules of international law, and the
international legal order itself, must evolve and adapt over time. These changes, much like changes in the
legislation of individual states, raise important issues concerning the quality of law.

The changing structure of international law
The International Law of Coexistence
To the extent that international law is based on the consent of states, its form and effectiveness tends to
be determined by the traditional pre-occupations of states. Foremost of these has generally been their desire to
advance the “national interest” usually defined in terms of the preservation of sovereignty and national security
through the management of international conflict. This minimalist version of international law is what Wolfgang
Friedmann so famously labeled the “international law of coexistence”.11 Since the initial formulation of the
modern law of nations circa 1648 there have always been doubts about the utility, and thus about the quality, of
positive international law. Do binding rules of international law unduly restrict the prerogatives of stronger states?
Are the rules adequate to protect the interests of smaller, weaker states, or of non-Western peoples whether
formally organized within a “state” or not? Does the entire system reflect principles of justice as any true legal
system should? These questions can never be fully resolved, but at least the international law of coexistence has
the virtue of being positive international law based on the consent of sovereign states. But is that law enough, and
what standards could we legitimately apply to reach that conclusion?
Friedmann answered that it was not enough, because international law changes. Indeed, it must be
capable of changing and adapting to the realities of the international system, just as it has adapted to such changes
in the past.12 This change has accelerated since the Second World War with the establishment of the United
Nations. In a parallel development, the emergence of new states from decolonization has transformed what was
“the exclusive club of Western Christian nations” into something much more complex, a “vast conglomeration
composed of states” representing “completely different religious and social cultures.”13
Since the Second World War there has also been a major thrust toward the enactment of a positive
international law of human rights. By articulating human rights norms in treaties and other international
normative instruments, States and international organizations have done more than simply create a few more
rules of positive international law. They have begun to transform the nature of the international system. As the
body of international legal rules expands and as its scope broadens into more and more matters once regarded as
the exclusive preserve of state sovereignty and internal law,14 concerns about the quality of law must increasingly
apply not only to national legislation but also to changes in the growing body of international legal rules. One basic
criterion for judging the quality of this law must focus upon the practical imperative of international cooperation.
11

Friedmann, CHANGING STRUCTURE, op. cit. note 7, p. 5.
See, Bartram S. Brown, The Protection of Human Rights in Disintegrating States: A New Challenge, CHICAGO-KENT
L. R. VOL. 68, p. 204 (1992).
13
Friedmann, CHANGING STRUCTURE, op. cit. note 7, p. 5.
14
“The changes in the dimensions of international law require a corresponding reorientation of its study; neither
the international lawyer trained in the classical methods of international law and diplomacy, nor the corporation,
tax or constitutional lawyer are equipped to handle this subject without cooperation with each other, and with
economists and political scientists. International law is becoming a more and more complex and many-sided
subject.” Friedmann, CHANGING STRUCTURE, op. cit. note 7 p. 70.
12

5

The International Law of Co-operation and Beyond
Based on the changes he saw coming in the international system Friedmann proposed that we
view international law, not as one body of principles, but on three different levels:
(a) The international law of coexistence, i.e. the classical system of international law regulating
diplomatic interstate relations, orders the coexistence of states regardless of their social and
economic structure.
(b) The universal international law of co-operation, i.e. the body of legal rules regulating
universal human concerns, the range of which is constantly expanding, extends from matters of
international security to questions of international communication, health and welfare.
(c) Closely knit regional groupings can proceed further with the common regulation of their
affairs because they are linked by a greater degree of community of interests and values, and
regional also of regional proximity, than mankind at large. They can therefore act as pioneers in
the transition from international to community law” 15 (Bold emphasis added)
Friedmann was certainly correct to anticipate the increasing importance of regional groupings as
pioneers in the building of a stronger international law based on community. The importance of this
regional normative layer has been clearly illustrated by the EU Parliament’s recent role in addressing
problems with the ACTA treaty (as will be discussed below). For now, however, it is important to focus
upon the growing international law of co-operation which he also anticipated. He saw that, in a world of
growing interdependence, international law needed to do more than help states to coexist and to stay
out of each other’s way. International law would also need to be effective in bringing states together in
a cooperative way to address and advance universal human concerns. His clarion call for an
international law of co-operation highlighted the practical need for international law to transcend its
focus on simple coexistence.
Others have echoed the call for this new law. Mohamed Bedjoui, president of the International
Court of Justice, once noted “[t]he resolutely positivist, voluntarist approach of international law still
current at the beginning of the [20th] century ... has been replaced by … a law more readily seeking to
reflect a collective juridical conscience and respond to the social necessities of States organized as a
community.”16

Positivism, principle and the practical imperative of co-operation:
“Vertical” criteria for the quality of international law
The international law of coexistence is all about respect for the sovereignty and the sovereign
prerogatives of states. As such, it is defined and limited by the extreme positivism which sovereignty
has traditionally been thought to entail. While sovereignty is no longer the supreme value in
international law today,17 positivism remains relevant as the basis of state obligations. It must therefore

15

Friedmann, CHANGING STRUCTURE, op. cit. note 7 p. p. 367.

16

Legality Of The Threat Or Use Of Nuclear Weapons, International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion (8 July 1996);
Declaration by President Bedjaoui, § 13.
17
Cf. the doctrine of jus cogens discussed below.
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be one of the primary criteria of quality of law analysis applicable to treaties. But, as noted above,
positivism cannot be the only such criterion.
International law, no less than national law, must to the extent possible aspire to reflect
fundamental principles of law and justice. So at times even sovereignty and positivism must yield.18
Thus although the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled in 1923 that “the right to enter into
international engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty"19 international law now formally
recognizes that a treaty that conflicts with a peremptory norm of international law, is null and void.20
This doctrine of jus cogens, acts as a limit upon the freedom of contract of sovereign states, and is
strong evidence of a renewed commitment to principle even within the still generally positivistic
framework International law. Consistency with principle, must in any case be an important criterion for
evaluating the quality of all positive law. As applied to international law, however, the task is even more
complex, as the language of a treaty, for example, should be consistent with principle in the dualist
perspective of both international law and national legal systems.
In the interdependent world of the 21st century the “universal international law of co-operation”
first described by Wolfgang Friedmann 50 years ago is more indispensable than ever. Both the
sovereignty of states and the understanding and realization of international principle must, at times,
accommodate the practical requirements of international cooperation.

Focus on the drafting of ACTA as a Case Study
The following case study will not attempt to make a comprehensive assessment of the text of
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Instead, the principal focus will be upon the process
of drafting and negotiating ACTA.

Background on ACTA
ACTA is a proposed treaty on standards for the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The
chronology of ACTA negotiations is long and complicated. Suffice it to say here that following
preliminary discussions beginning in 2007, the treaty text emerged from formal negotiations between

18

Cf. the quote from Cicero, supra. note 2.
Wimbledon, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at at 25.
20
The doctrine of jus cogens, long often thought to be a necessary principle of justice, has achieved status as part
of positive international law. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
Article 53
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)
19

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.
For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.
UN Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 UNTS 331; 8 ILM 679 (1969); 63 AJIL 875 (1969),
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
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June 2008 and May 2011 among several leading industrialized countries plus Morocco and Mexico.21 Six
rounds of closed negotiations were held before a draft of the agreement was first released to the public
in April of 2010. In addition to the negotiating states a limited number of individuals representing
corporations, NGOs, and cleared advisors were permitted to view the developing texts before that first
public disclosure. All were required to sign a very strong nondisclosure agreement prohibiting them
from making any of these documents public.22 An earlier “discussion paper” and another draft
identifying the negotiating positions of individual countries23 were leaked to the public by Wikileaks
before the April 2010 draft. These, even more than the final text of the treaty, raised serious concerns
about the nature and scope of the state obligations it would establish. Many academics, practitioners
and public interest organizations concluded that the terms of the publicly released draft of ACTA were
unacceptable, and a group of over 75 US law professors signed a letter to President Obama demanding
that ACTA not be accepted without fundamental changes.24 Some modifications were made to the draft
before the final text of ACTA was publicly released in November of 2010, but the basic thrust and
structure of ACTA, as established during years of closed negotiations, remained unaltered. That basic
thrust is to replicate the rules and enforcement approaches used to combat trade in physical counterfeit
goods and to extend them, without significant modification, to electronic file-sharing.
At a ceremony in Tokyo on October 1, 2011, the United States, Australia, Canada, Korea, Japan,
New Zealand, Morocco, and Singapore signed the final text of ACTA. Representatives of the remaining
ACTA negotiating parties, the European Union, Mexico, and Switzerland, confirmed at that time their
continuing intention to sign the Agreement as soon as practicable.25

The Outcry Against ACTA
ACTA was largely a US initiative, reflecting the fact that powerful US interests such as the
Motion Picture Association of America and the Recording Industry Association of America have long
demanded greater protections for their intellectual property rights, under both national and
international law. Within US domestic law some aspects of implementing ACTA would have been

21

The negotiating states included Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), represented by the European
Commission and the EU Presidency and the EU Member States, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand,
Singapore, Switzerland and the United States of America.
22
Letter of October 9, 2009, from Carmen Suro-Bredie, Chief FOIA Officer, Office of the US Trade Representative,
to Mr. James Love, Director, Knowledge Ecology International, in response to a US Freedom of Information Act
request for the names of all persons not employed by the US government who have been given access to
documents relating to the position of the U.S. government for the Internet provisions of the Anti-Counterfeiting
Trade Agreement and copies of those agreements, http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/ustr-oct9letter_foia.pdf
23
See, ACTA Informal Predecisional/Deliberative Draft: January 18, 2010,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=8&ved=0CFcQFjAH&url=http%3A%2F%2Fch
ristianengstrom.files.wordpress.com%2F2010%2F03%2Facta-20100118-consolidated-text.doc&ei=txnrTrBAeam4gTZ8IjuAg&usg=AFQjCNFgcACpaJE-v177UqoDAmxCuJVS8g
24
Letter from Law Professors to President Barak Obama Calling for the Halt of ACTA, October 28, 2010,
http:wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/academics10282010
25
Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties, October 1, 2011,
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/joint-press-statement-anticounterfeiting-trade-ag.

8

addressed by two proposed legislative bills known as the Stop Internet Piracy Act (SOPA)26 and the
Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA).27 In early 2012 the US Congress was moving towards a vote on
those bills which provoked an unprecedented Internet blackout protest by internet companies such as
Google and Wikipedia followed by mass protests in a number of US cities. There were rumors that the
bill would lead to internet censorship, to policing of internet communications and electronic media and
even to searches of computers and smartphones at border crossings to detect illegally copied media. In
response to the protests the vote on SOPA /PIPA was indefinitely delayed.28
Inspired in part by the success of the earlier US protests regarding SOPA, in February of 2012
thousands of protestors marched in the streets of Budapest, Paris, Prague, Vilnius, Transylvania and
other cities in Europe to protest ACTA.29 Once again, concern about Internet freedoms was the principal
cause of public opposition to the treaty. Support for ACTA in Europe quickly began to erode.
Some of the most damning critiques of the ACTA negotiating process, and of the text of ACTA
itself, have emanated from the European Parliament. Kader Arif, a French member of the European
Parliament, quit as that body's special rapporteur for ACTA. Afterwards, he was scathing in his critique
of the treaty.30 He stated that that ACTA was ''wrong in both form and substance'' and that the
European officials who began negotiating the agreement in 2007, kept EU legislators in the dark for
years and ignored their concerns, ultimately presenting them with a finished deal for ratification with no
real possibility of modifying it. ''Voila, that's the masquerade that I denounce,'' he said.31
And this reaction was not an isolated response to ACTA. Another European Parliament
statement on ACTA was prepared for the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, for the
Committee on International Trade of the European Parliament. That report is much less scathing in
26

Stop Online Piracy Act , H.R.3261, Sponsored by Rep. Lamar Smith, introduced 10/26/2011,
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/112%20HR%203261.pdf
27
PROTECT IP Act, Introduced in the Senate as S. 968 by Patrick Leahy on May 12, 2011,
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s968rs/pdf/BILLS-112s968rs.pdf
28
See, David Jolly, Intellectual Property Pact Draws Fire in Europe, The New York Times, February 6, 2012, Section
B; Column 0; Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 5. “In the U.S. protests, Web sites including Wikipedia went dark Jan. 18,
and more than seven million people signed Google's online petition opposing the Stop Online Piracy Act and the
Protect Intellectual Property Act. Ultimately, even the bills' sponsors in the U.S. Congress backed down under the
onslaught of public criticism.”
29
Ibid.
30
Among the most critical of his comments were these:
“Everyone knows the ACTA agreement is problematic, whether it is its impact on civil liberties, the way it
makes Internet access providers liable, its consequences on generic drugs manufacturing, or how little
protection it gives to our geographical indications.”
“This agreement might have major consequences on citizens' lives, and still, everything is being done to
prevent the European Parliament from having its say in this matter. That is why today, as I release this report
for which I was in charge, I want to send a strong signal and alert the public opinion about this unacceptable
situation. I will not take part in this masquerade.”
See, ACTA: une mascarade à laquelle je ne participerai pas - Kader Arif blog
http://www.kader-arif.fr/actualites.php?actualite_id=147, translation from
https://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/ACTA_rapporteur_denounces_ACTA_mascarade.
31
David Jolly, Intellectual Property Pact Draws Fire in Europe, THE NEW YORK TIMES, February 6, 2012, Late Edition –
Final, Section B; Column 0; Business/Financial Desk; Pg. 5.
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tone, it is also highly critical of ACTA although in a more balanced, nuanced and ultimately more
persuasive way. 32

Analysis: Evaluating the Quality of ACTA as Law
Most of the potential problems with the quality of ACTA as law reflect, at least in part, the
failure to follow basic principles of legislation and legislative drafting. These principles are essentially
the same whether applied to national legislation, or with minor adjustments to international treaty
drafting. The most relevant of these recognizes that high quality legislation should be clear, succinct,
readable, understandable and effective at achieving a clearly defined goal.33 Process-wise this requires
the gathering of information necessary to the drafting effort, consideration of alternative approaches or
mechanisms to accomplish the identified goals, and most importantly, a careful pre-assessment of the
likely effects of the law. Other requirements may apply as well, 34 but some go beyond the scope of this
paper.
The need for transparency is an over-arching consideration generally applicable to decisionmaking in a democratic context. As will be discussed immediately below, ACTA fares poorly as
measured by most of the above criteria.
What of the additional “vertical criteria” mentioned earlier? As a matter of positivism and
respect for state sovereignty there would not initially appear to be any difficulty with ACTA. States are
free to consent to whatever obligations they wish to accept. Viewed holistically, however, the ACTA
process created the impression that a small number of ACTA negotiating states were attempting to
legislate for the broader international community. Of course, as a formal matter, ACTA cannot create
obligations for non-party states, but even false impressions can become a source of problems. Thus the
ACTA experience could eventually have the unintended consequence of making it more difficult for the
negotiating states to achieve their goal of stronger multilateral cooperation and coordination in IP rights
enforcement.
If this occurs it will be unfortunate. There is a practical need for states to cooperate on IP
enforcement matters as on so many other issues. Indeed; Wolfgang Friedmann’s international law of
cooperation could be cited as a reason for something along the lines of ACTA. Of course if the needed
32

See, Dimitrios Droutsas, Rapporteur, Draft Opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,
for the Committee on International Trade (European Parliament) on the compatibility of ACTA with the rights
enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union(bold emphasis added)(COM(2011)0380 –
C7-0027/2012 – 2011/0167(NLE), PA\889383EN.doc, PE480.574v01-00, 07.05.2012, available @
http://acta.ffii.org/?p=1325
33
Cf. Eugene C. Thomas, The Center For Quality Of Law -- A New ABA Service, ABA JOURNAL, Vol. 72 (1986) page 6,
essentially restating the criteria of Montesquieu, discussed supra. note 3 and the associated text. .
34
Other points apply as well. “As seen from a holistic perspective there are five points which are of vital
importance to the law-drafting process and its methods: (1) the informational background for the law during the
drafting process; (2) the identification of the alternative regulatory and other mechanisms available to the
particular lawdrafting effort; (3) the assessment and forecast of the effects of the law; (4) the implementation of
the rules and supportive measures; and (5) the subsequent study and evaluation of the impact of the law.” Jyrki
Tala, Juhani Korhonen & Kaijus Ervasti, Government Perspective: Improving The Quality Of Law Drafting In Finland,
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW, Vol. 4, (1998) page 633.
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cooperation is not done according to fundamental principles, such as transparency, and respect for
international human rights in holistic perspective, then it will lack democratic legitimacy and overall
credibility as does ACTA.
Principal Problems with the Negotiating Process
Secrecy and Lack of Transparency
When the European Parliament’s Rapporteur on ACTA resigned from that post his strongest
protest concerned the ACTA negotiating process:
I want to denounce in the strongest possible manner the entire process that led to the signature of
this agreement: no inclusion of civil society organisations, a lack of transparency from the start of
the negotiations, repeated postponing of the signature of the text without an explanation being
ever given, exclusion of the EU Parliament's demands that were expressed on several occasions in
our assembly.35
Transparency and the participation of broad sectors of civil society in the identification of key
societal interests, objectives, and priorities are essential to the process of drafting quality legislation.
Without an open, inclusive public debate between the relevant stakeholders on what is to be
accomplished and how, the drafters of legislation are simply not in a position to know what needs to be
done and what problems need to be avoided. The resulting legislation will therefore lack both balance
and democratic legitimacy. This is even more true when the negotiation of a treaty is concerned.
Defenders of ACTA have argued that the closed and secret nature of negotiations on the treaty
were justified by its supposed status as a trade agreement, and there is some precedent for the use of
closed negotiations to reach agreement on sensitive trade matters. The problem with this argument is
that ACTA is not, fundamentally, a trade agreement. It does not deal with tariffs, trade barriers or
subsidies. ACTA is fundamentally an intellectual property enforcement treaty, and it is precisely the
provisions of the treaty on intellectual property enforcement that are problematical.
The negotiating parties went to great lengths to maintain the secrecy of the ACTA negotiations.
As noted above they did not release any working text of the treaty until years into the negotiating
process. Ironically, it was leaked documents which first revealed potential problems with the treaty.
This lead the European Parliament to pass a resolution on 10 March 2010 deploring “the calculated
choice of the parties not to negotiate through well-established international bodies, such as WIPO and
the WTO, which have established frameworks for public information and consultation.” The resolution
also calls for the European Commission and European Council to “grant public and parliamentary access
to ACTA negotiation texts and summaries,” and reserves for the European Parliament the “right to take
suitable action, including bringing a case before the European Court of Justice in order to safeguard its
prerogatives.”36
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negotiations,
Doc.
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There are doubtless situations when national security, or other important considerations, may
justify even a liberal democracy in maintaining, at least for a while, some limited secrecy in treaty
negotiations. Nonetheless, these should be narrow and very limited exceptions. There could be no
excuse for invoking national security as justification for the years of secret negotiations used in drafting
ACTA. Shockingly, however, that is exactly what the US government did. When an NGO formally
requested ACTA negotiating texts from the US government under the US Freedom of Information Act
the request was denied on the grounds of national security. 37 It is difficult to imagine any valid rationale
for taking such extreme measures to maintain the secrecy of ACTA negotiations. In retrospect, these
measures have had a very detrimental effect upon the prospects for any viable agreement on
international IP enforcement. This secrecy fed the fears of those who would later take to the streets in
protest of ACTA. It also deprived the ACTA debate of many needed voices and perspectives. As one
European Parliament official noted:
Against such a monumental challenge, what we absolutely need is that every expert we have, every
affected organisation or institution we can spare, every citizen that desires to voice an opinion
participates, from the beginning, in the creation of a modern social pact, a modern regime of
protecting intellectual property rights. ACTA is not, and was not conceived to be, this. Instead, the
Rapporteur believes that an adoption of ACTA would prematurely strangle the debate and tip the
balance on one side, would allow for Member States to experiment on laws that could potentially
harm fundamental freedoms and set precedents that could be undesirable for future societies.38
(Bold emphasis added)
In addition to the matter of secrecy, the critique above also touches upon a second major flaw
in the ACTA negotiations. When an official draft text was finally released and critical comments began
to multiply, the negotiating states decided to finalize the text and move to quick adoption. When several
countries signed ACTA in October of 2010 the public debate on it had barely begun. The decision to
finalize ACTA at that time was clearly premature.
Precipitous Action on Issues of Great Importance
The basic rationale for ACTA, its raison d’être, is that a lot is at stake because it is so vitally
important to protect intellectual property rights.39 It is undoubtedly true that a lot is at stake. But this
very fact should have provided all the more reason to get the process right. There was a lot at stake not
only in economic terms related to intellectual property rights, but also in terms of the potential human
rights implications of the treaty.
37

“Please be advised that the documents you seek are being withheld in full pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(1), which
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The draft report of another European Parliament Committee on ACTA stresses that too much is
at stake to rush prematurely into an unbalanced approach to these complex issues as ACTA does:
The culture of file-sharing, enabled by the remarkable technological advance of the last decades,
certainly poses direct challenges to the way we have dealt with compensation of artists and proper
enforcement of intellectual rights for the past decades. Our task, as policymakers, is to overcome
this challenge by striking an acceptable balance between the possibilities that technology unravels
and the continuation of artistic creation, which is an emblematic token of Europe’s place in the
world.
We are therefore, at a defining moment of this debate, an exciting juncture of change. In this sense,
your Rapporteur believes that ACTA comes at a very premature stage and a possible adoption of
the Treaty would essentially freeze the possibility of having a public deliberation that is worthy of
our democratic heritage.40 (Bold emphasis added)
What was needed was the active participation of representatives of key sectors of civil society
on both sides of this issue. Instead only one side, essentially representing IP rights holders, was invited
to review the early drafts of ACTA. These early drafts were decisive in that they established the
structure, tone and approach of the treaty. The lawyers for the Motion Picture Association of America
are no doubt skilled and talented negotiators and drafters, but they were simply not in a position to
raise and address the potential human rights implications of the stronger intellectual property
protections favored by their clients.
Lawyers have a professional responsibility to represent the interests of their clients, and cannot
be expected to do otherwise. But the negotiating countries and private-sector intellectual property
lawyers involved may not have appreciated the vital role that internet freedoms play in countries where
civil rights and liberties of various kinds have not been, or at least have not long been, established.
There are many civil society organizations who could have raised this and other related points in the
negotiations, but none of them were invited to participate. The failure of ACTA is evidence of their
absence.
What was needed here was careful and open consideration of how best to achieve an
acceptable balancing of these key interests. No such discussion has occurred so far, and of course, the
negotiations have already concluded.
Inadequate Precaution Regarding the Possible Negative Effect Upon Human Rights Worldwide
Although the text of ACTA does not use the term “human rights” it does call for enforcement
action which “preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and
privacy.” So far so good, but the reference to these specific rights seems pro forma and functionally
isolated from the operative thrust of the treaty.41 It is not enough merely to mention a few human
40
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rights in the text of a treaty. A precautionary approach, similar to the precautionary principle that
applies under international environmental law,42 should apply to actions which may have detrimental
effects upon fundamental human rights. Had such a precautionary approach been taken the ACTA
negotiating states might well have anticipated the potential for harm to fundamental human rights. If
they had worked with civil society organizations to address these issues from the start, some of the
more troubling aspects of the ACTA treaty might have been avoided.
It should be stressed here that even though ACTA itself may not require actions in violation of
fundamental human rights, this is only one small part of the potential human rights impact of the treaty.
The potential effects of any legislative text should be considered in “holistic context.”43 Insofar as ACTA
would require states to protect admittedly difficult-to-protect intellectual property rights it could,
especially if more broadly adopted, be invoked as justification for repressive enforcement measures that
the US and EU states themselves might never tolerate. Thus ACTA cannot be properly evaluated in
isolation from the broader context of the global struggle for human rights.
The ACTA negotiating states are among the world’s leaders in promoting international human
rights. Their efforts in this regard have been critically important, and in negotiating ACTA, they did not
set out to undermine international human rights. Nonetheless, this might have been an unintended
consequence of the treaty. It would be a sad and perverse development if the efforts of those states to
promote human rights word-wide, were to be inadvertently undermined by the ACTA treaty they
formulated in isolation from the broader issues concerned.
The Deceptive Scope of ACTA
As the name Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement indicates, ACTA is supposed to be about
halting the trade in counterfeit goods. Unfortunately, its scope goes far beyond this. ACTA combines
and conflates action with regard to at least three essentially different phenomena. The first of these is
the trade in counterfeit goods which is a widespread, well-known and universally condemned form of
criminal activity. The second, which may or may not be a widespread problem, is the for-profit
commercial distribution of pirated movies, music, software and other intellectual property via the
internet. This is in many ways analogous to the trade in counterfeit goods, and could be addressed in
much the same way
But ACTA’s principal innovative thrust, and the principal cause of concern about the agreement,
concerns an entirely different matter, i.e. not-for-profit internet file-sharing which is a relatively new
and admittedly widespread activity. There is, as yet, no consensus on how best to address this issue at
either the national or the international level. In other words, not-for-profit file sharing is simply not yet
a matter ripe for the promulgation of international treaty standards. ACTA attempts to gloss over this
problem, with the completely undefined concept of “commercial-scale” piracy discussed briefly below.
This compounds the problem of the deceptive scope of the treaty by requiring the criminal enforcement
of a dangerously vague notion of law.

42
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How Bad is the Actual text of ACTA?
Without attempting to make a comprehensive assessment of the text of ACTA, it seems
appropriate at this point to offer a few brief comments on the actual text itself.
Most of the Rumored Defects do Not Appear in the Treaty Text
****
Vague Language in a Penal Law Context
Potential criminalization of non-commercial copyright infringement
The point has often been made, in defense of ACTA, that the treaty does not establish new rules
of intellectual property law, but is only intended to coordinate the enforcement of existing national IP
law.44 While this may have been the original “intent” of the parties as the negotiations began, it is clear
that parts of the treaty do go beyond existing national laws in requiring the criminalization of noncommercial copyright infringement.
Article 23 on criminal offences requires states to provide criminal procedures and penalties to
be applied to what it refers to as “rights related piracy on a commercial scale,” but the text never offers
any definition of what “on a commercial scale means.” How, if at all, would this apply to not-for-profit
participation in bitnet style file-sharing, for example? This activity is not commercial insofar as no
money changes hands and no one profits. Is this Article to be read to suggest that at some point, the
sheer scale and volume of an individual’s participation in file-sharing should be deemed to be virtually
“commercial.” That seems to be the most plausible interpretation of the treaty language. And yet it
cannot be said that there is an international consensus on the meaning of this language since there is no
accepted definition, in ACTA or elsewhere, of “commercial scale” piracy.
The use of vague language is inherently incompatible with good legislation,45 and even less
compatible with good penal legislation. Were the language of ACTA’s Article 23 to be enacted into
national legislation it would raise serious issues of legality.
Language which leaves the door open to abusive IP related border searches
Perhaps the most commonly heard objection to ACTA is that it would authorize customs agents
to search computers and smartphones at border crossing in search of pirated music, movies software
and the like. On this score, the actual text of ACTA is neither clearly threatening nor clearly reassuring.
Section 3 of ACTA is addressed to “Border Measures,” and the bulk of that section refers only to
“suspect goods” which one might normally expect to refer to physical goods and therefore to exclude
copies of electronic media. Unfortunately the text of ACTA frequently seems to conflate the two.
Furthermore, Article 13 on the “Scope of Border Measures” suggests that border enforcement of IP
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rights should “not discriminate unjustifiably between intellectual property rights.” This could be
interpreted to mean that the rules of that section should apply more broadly to all materials alleged to
violate IP rights.
Article 14(2), in turn, states that “[a] Party may exclude from the application of this section small
quantities of goods of a non-commercial nature contained in traveler’s personal luggage.” This
provision seems on its surface to encourage moderation and respect for privacy by allowing states to
relax border enforcement targeting personal luggage. But in stating this “permissive” rule the
implication is that such searches of personal luggage are OK. Whether such border searches are
acceptable is not wholly an issue of international trade law. Viewed in broader perspective it is an issue
of civil liberties, a key aspect of international human rights.
Requiring Alleged Infringers to Inform on Third Persons Alleged to be Involved
Article 11 of the ACTA text calls for the judicial authorities of the parties to have the authority,
upon the request of the right holder, to order the infringer, or even the alleged infringer, to provide any
information relating to the infringement that he or she possesses or controls including the
“identification of third persons alleged to be involved.” This could raise a number of troubling issues,
but in any case it would be excessive to order anyone to inform on third parties before there has been a
judicial determination of actual infringement.

The Future of ACTA
The European Court of Justice has been asked to rule on whether ACTA is consistent with "the
EU's fundamental rights and freedoms,"46 and a ruling against ACTA could doom the treaty. Meanwhile
four different European Parliament committees (International Trade, Civil Liberties, Industry, Legal
Affairs and Development) all recommended that the European Parliament should reject ACTA47 and it
did so on July 4, 2012***. Without European participation, it is doubtful whether the treaty will ever
receive the 6 ratifications it needs to enter into effect 48 even for those states (if any) which may finally
decide to ratify it.

Observations and Conclusions
It is not surprising that IP rights holders, left to formulate their wish-list of changes in intellectual
property law and its enforcement, made extreme proposals which completely failed to balance the
broader interests of national and international societies. What is surprising is the way the negotiating
46
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governments provided a forum, and a process, which allowed these unbalanced proposals to be
formulated in secret and without input from the broader public until the very late stages. The almost
inevitable result was an unbalanced and flawed text which, by the time it was released to the public,
was susceptible only to minor revisions. From the start, this was a recipe for bad law.
It should be apparent that the process and approach taken in negotiating ACTA violated basic
principles of legislation, and could scarcely have been expected to produce law of an acceptable quality.
This problem would be serious indeed even if the law concerned were national legislation. Since ACTA
purports to set standards at a “plurilateral” level it is doubly dangerous
This is not to say that the entertainment industry does not have a legitimate interest in
addressing its concerns regarding file-sharing. But if the matter is one of great importance then the
need for an open and transparent debate about the values concerned is all the more important. The
basic thrust, goal and approach of ACTA is to replicate the rules and enforcement approaches used to
combat trade in physical counterfeit goods and to extend them, unmodified, to electronic file-sharing.
One can certainly understand that rights holders would favor this approach, but there is no broad
international agreement on this yet. Most IP standards developed prior to the development of
cyberspace as we know it today. The application of these same standards to the new domain of
cyberspace may well be appropriate, but not without carefully adapting them, as needed, to the unique
circumstances which prevail in that space.
Surprisingly, the separation of powers between European Union institutions proved to be a key
factor in the demise of ACTA. Were if not for the European Parliament the European negotiators,
(including the European Commission), seemed determined to complete the ACTA treaty process at all
costs.
What lessons can we learn from ACTA about the vertical dimension in the quality of law? First
of all it has been confirmed that the use of almost conspiratorial secrecy to negotiate a treaty of broad
scope and effect is inconsistent with democratic values. It is also evident that important new
international standards should not be established before individual states have had a chance to debate
them openly and hopefully, to achieve internal consensus on the problem, the objective, the approach,
the risk/return balance, etc. In sum, the lesson is that some proposed international standards are simply
not ripe for vertical integration into national, or even regional, legal orders.
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